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ANALYSIS OF A TERROR NETWORK FROM A SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Terrorism is a complex problem and therefore simple solutions focusing just on one aspect are 
destined to fail. We have to capture terrorism in its entirety and system dynamics offers 
various tools to support us. We developed a semi-quantitative system dynamics approach 
aiming to characterize relationships between different variables and their impact on the 
system as a whole. The authors established a network to model terrorism consisting of 16 
variables and performed different analysis to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms 
behind terrorism. We showed how to determine which variables are suited for intervention 
and described in detail their effects on the influence of the terrorist organization. The paper 
gives also an insight how to elicit elements that destabilize and ultimately break down the 
terror network.  Because we clarify our approach using fictitious numbers, the relevance of 
this work is not so much in specific policy recommendations that it proposes as in the 
framework for reasoning that it provides.  
KEYWORDS 
 
Qualitative System Dynamics, Cross-Impact Matrix, Cross-Time Matrix, Intervention 
Variables, Path Analysis, Network Stability 
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INTRODUCTION 
The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 brought 
terrorism back into focus in Western society. Since that date, governments and international 
organizations have actively combated problems related to international terrorism. In the fight 
against terrorism, the U.S. took a pioneering approach that was based primarily on military 
tactics. However, this approach has not succeeded in eradicating terrorism. The 2004 Madrid 
and 2005 London attacks in Europe displayed a new facet of this barbaric phenomenon: 
homegrown terrorism. As suggested by the word ‘homegrown,’ this type of terrorism is 
carried out by residents or citizens attacking their own country. In the decade since the attack 
on the twin towers, homegrown terrorism has emerged from a marginal topic to a central issue 
in contemporary discussions about possible terrorist threats. However, according to Brooks, it 
is not very meaningful to focus predominantly on homegrown terrorism. In her research, she 
found that at least in the United States, Muslim homegrown terrorism is not a particularly 
serious public menace.
1 
 
The war against terrorism has already lasted for several years, and there is – despite Osama 
Bin Laden’s death – no end in sight. This raises the question of whether alternative anti-
terrorist measures could be more promising. In this context, we present an unconventional 
approach to terrorism. We analyze terrorism from a system dynamics perspective. System 
dynamics is a method of capturing complex issues in a holistic way, and its focus lies in the 
crucial elements and their interrelations in a given framework. This approach substantially 
facilitates the understanding of the behavior of complex systems and enables us to make 
predictions of the system’s evolution and to propose potential measures to change the 
dynamics of a system. Very few attempts have been done to connect terrorism with system 
dynamics modeling. Grynkewich tried in his analysis to model the financial subsystem of the 
‘Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat’. He focused primarily on just one element of 
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terrorism namely fundraising.
2
 On the contrary we built a generic model including several key 
variables of terrorism.    
The aim of this paper is to present a complete new method how to deal with terrorism. We are 
going to illustrate this method using a model that combines different key aspects of terrorism. 
Because we clarify our approach using fictitious numbers, the relevance of this work is not so 
much in specific policy recommendations that it proposes as in the framework for reasoning 
that it provides.    
In particular, we explore the following research questions: 
- How can we model a terror network?  
- What variables are most influential in this network and thus are suitable for 
intervention in the system? 
- What effect do these intervention variables have on the terrorist organization? 
- How can we destabilize a terror network? Which bundles of variables have to be 
removed to efficiently break down the terror network? 
With the aid of simple algorithms, we are capable of modeling the dynamics of a terror 
network. We argue that an intervention variable must be highly interlinked and should quickly 
disseminate changes throughout the system. Applied to our model are three variables suited 
for intervention: control of overreaction, right target of anti-terror measures and anti-terror 
support by moderate forces. The variable control of overreaction means that a country is 
capable of reacting rationally and adequately following a terrorist attack. There is a danger 
that governments make highly emotional decisions in such situations and tend to overreact. It 
is often the case that the retaliation measures are disproportionally severe and hurt not only 
the terrorist organization but also civilians. This can aggravate problems related to terrorism 
and lead to a substantial boost in the recruitment of new terrorists. The variable right target of 
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anti-terror measures has a similar meaning. It is of crucial importance to plan and execute 
military operations carefully. Retaliatory actions should strike the Achilles’ heel of the 
terrorist organization and weaken it in the long run. The last variable appropriate for 
intervention is anti-terror support by moderate forces. Moderate forces are population groups 
within a hostile country, area or organization that are opposed to terrorism. These moderate 
groups are important allies in countries with active terrorist organizations.  
We will describe in detail the impacts of right target of anti-terror measures and anti-terror 
support by moderate forces on the influence of the terrorist organization. Among the two, 
right target choice is the most effective in our example. In the final section, we will analyze 
the robustness of the network by removing single and multiple variables. To completely 
dismantle our terrorist network, we must approach the problem at three points: the 
recruitment of potential manpower, the impact of attacks and media reports. 
The article is divided in five main sections. First, it provides an overview of the definition, 
forms and history of terrorism. Second, the article contains a brief introduction to qualitative 
system dynamics. Third, it presents the terror network and its variables. It concludes with an 
extensive analysis of the network and resulting recommendations based on our terror model.     
DEFINITION, FORMS AND HISTORY OF TERRORISM 
Definition 
Terrorism is an evolving concept. As the face of terrorism has been changing over the last 
decades, so has the definition. It adapts to the political language and the political discourses of 
a particular epoch, which makes it difficult to find a time-consistent, universal definition. 
Terrorism is a matter of perception and is thus regarded differently by different observers.
3
 
According to Rossi, terrorism is an instrument of politics based on violence to achieve a 
specific political goal, regardless of existing peaceful instruments, such as negotiations.
4
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Horchem defines terrorism as the systematic use of murder and destruction to impose a 
political vision on individuals, groups, communities or governments.
5
  
In this context, Waldmann stresses the creation of fear and fright with the aim of undermining 
the existing social and political order and a subsequent profound transformation of the 
system.
6
 The U.S. government defines terrorism as follows: "Terrorism means premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non combatant targets by sub-national 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”7  
According to Kydd and Walter terrorism represents the use of violence against civilians by 
nonstate actors to achieve political goals. These goals can be: regime change, territorial 
change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance.
8
 
Combining the preceding definitions terrorism can be explained by four essential 
characteristics:
9 
- Terrorism always has a political character. Therefore, violence in conjunction with 
financial interests or revenge is ruled out.  
- Target choice is non-random. We must assume that there is an in-depth preparation 
and planning phase before a terrorist attack.  
- The civil population is struck intentionally. Whereas in a military operation the enemy 
combatants are attacked, here non-combatants are affected. 
- The terrorist organization is composed of non-state actors. 
Forms of Contemporary Terrorism 
Terrorism can be classified either by its geographical expansion or by its motivation. We use 
here the latter approach and distinguish between five different forms of contemporary 
terrorism: 
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(1) Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorism: Political autonomy is the main feature of this  
kind of terrorism. Its origin lies in independence movements following the Second World War, 
which put the colonial powers of different countries under great pressure. The challenged 
governments reacted impetuously, leading to increased solidarity among large groups of the 
concerned population and eventually to armed revolution. The key success factor was a clear 
and easily understandable message shared by a large proportion of the population. A very 
recent example of this kind of terrorism is Iraq, where different groups competed to maximize 
their autonomy, to prevent a new order and to weaken the existing government.
10
  
(2) Social-revolutionary terrorism: Inspired by successful activities of nationalistic terrorists, 
so-called social-revolutionary terrorism developed in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The background was mostly communist or socialist, and those engaging in this type of 
terrorism have attracted worldwide attention through spectacular actions.
11
 However, the 
success rate was minimal, and the terrorists were unable to gain any political concessions 
from their democratic opponents, nor could they provoke overreactions. With the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, social revolutionary groups such as the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) lost their 
ideological basis and are no longer active. 
(3) Vigilante terrorism: This type represents the counterpoint to social-revolutionary terrorism. 
There is no aim to weaken the existing state or government. Vigilante terrorists try to 
strengthen existing law and order by targeting groups, especially minorities, that are seen as 
the cause of social and welfare problems. The danger of this form of terrorism is the erosion 
of the legitimacy and stability of a government. Under the cloak of fighting terrorism, 
vigilante groups may act as free riders and perpetrate violence against minorities.  
(4) Single-issue terrorism: This new form of terrorism was developed at the end of the 20th 
century. This is a very specialized form of terrorism, one that involves, for instance, radical 
anti-abortionists or eco-terrorists.  
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(5) Religious terrorism: The phenomenon of religiously motivated terrorism is widely 
discussed, and many scholars consider this form of terrorism to be currently the most 
important and most dangerous. With respect to religiously motivated terrorism, one must 
distinguish whether it is linked to political objectives or to a fanatic religious understanding, 
where the terrorists define themselves as an instrument of a divine will. It is obvious that the 
potential for violence is much higher with regard to the second form.
12
 In reality, often both 
forms are combined. Recent developments clearly indicate that violence associated with 
religious terrorism has been increasing since the beginning of the 1990s. Even though the 
number of terrorist acts has declined, the number of victims has risen sharply.
13
 For example, 
the activities of Al-Quaida in the period from 1998 to 2004 were responsible for 0.1 % of all 
terrorist attacks but 19 % of all victims during that period, due to 9/11 and subsequent attacks 
in Bali, Madrid and London. 
We will focus in this paper on religiously motivated terrorism because it is currently the most 
important form of terrorism. 
Historical Review 
Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon. The Zealots-Sicarri, Jewish terrorists fighting against 
Roman governance in Judea, killed their victims with poniards in the heart of Jerusalem in the 
first century B.C.E.
14
 The term ‘terrorism’ was officially used the first time in history during 
the French Revolution. At that time, however, in contrast to today, the term ‘terrorism’ was 
positively associated with power and the newly established French government.
15
 The ‘régime 
de la terreur’ over the years 1793-94 was used as an instrument for the enforcement of law 
and order in a time of disturbances and riots. In intimidating political opponents, dissidents 
and subversive elements, the new government wanted to send a clear message that resistance 
to the Revolution was futile and suicidal. According to Rapoport's fundamental studies on the 
phenomenon of ‘holy terror,’ religion was the only justification for terrorism until the 19th 
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century.
16
 However, with the end of divine right monarchies in Europe and at the beginning of 
the 19th century, the motivation for terrorism changed from religiously motivated terrorism to 
secularly motivated terrorism. It was no longer religion that stood behind terroristic activities 
but a new understanding of the roles of the citizen and the state as well as a new interpretation 
of nationalism and self-determination. The Marxist ideologies, anarchism and nihilism 
legitimized terroristic activities to improve the state and the welfare of the public.
17 
 
In 1968, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an 
airplane of the Israeli airline El-Al in a highly symbolic terroristic act. According to Hoffman, 
the year 1968 can be described as the year marking the beginning of modern international 
terrorism.
18
 In 1968, only 5 out of 52 identified terrorist groups could be regarded as 
religiously motivated (none of them were internationally active); the rest were fighting for 
secular reasons.
19
 
The first ‘modern’, internationally active and religiously motivated terror groups were 
detected following the 1980 Iranian revolution. In subsequent years, the number of religiously 
motivated terror groups increased dramatically. Initially, this movement was closely linked to 
Islam, but by the next decade, terrorist activities were being carried out in the name of all 
major world religions. No religion was completely immune to the dangerous mixture of faith, 
fanaticism and violence.
20
 In 1994, about one-third (16 out of 49 groups) could be classified 
as ‘religiously motivated’, whereas by 2004, this proportion had risen to 42 %.21 Indeed, the 
enormous importance of religion as the main impetus of international terrorism was evident 
before 9/11. All of the most serious terrorist attacks of the past decade can be attributed to 
religiously motivated terrorism.
22
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QUALITATIVE SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
A system dynamics approach differs substantially from traditional analyses. Traditional 
analyses divide the subject of interest continuously into further specialized disciplines and 
focus on a small number of linear causal relationships between phenomena, explaining them 
in terms of their smallest identifiable parts. However, this approach often leads to incorrect 
results and creates inappropriate incentives. In contrast to these traditional analyses, system 
dynamics concentrates on how a subject of interest interacts with other variables. Rather than 
breaking a system down into smaller components, system dynamics expands the view of a 
user, taking into account increasingly greater numbers of interactions. Maani and Cavana
23
 
define system dynamics as “the ability to see things as a whole. It combines the art of seeing 
interconnections and the science of explaining complexity.” System dynamics implies that the 
variables of a system have to be considered in a dynamic way and requires thinking in terms 
of processes instead of steady states. System dynamics focuses, on the one hand, on the 
interactions between the different variables in a certain system and, on the other hand, on the 
interactions between the different variables and the system as a whole. Internal and external 
influences affect the relations between the variables of a system and often do not occur 
deterministically.
24
 Feedback processes are important in this context. They can be either direct 
or indirect and can dramatically influence the behavior of a system. 
To use qualitative system dynamics, we must establish a network. To do so, the most 
important stakeholders and their objectives as well as their relationships have to be modeled.  
In general, the relationship between two variables can be either positive or negative. A 
positive relationship means that an increase in variable A leads to an increase in variable B, 
and a negative one implies that an increase in variable A leads to a decrease in variable C (see 
Figure 1). To perform an analysis, we must specify the type of relationship between two 
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variables, the strength of their interaction, and the time required for one variable to influence 
another. 
Figure 1. Possible relations of two variables in a network 
 
 
 
 
THE TERROR NETWORK 
The terror network presented in Figure 2 and analyzed in this paper is based on the network 
established and published by Frederic Vester after 9/11 and adapted to international 
developments in this area.
25
 Vester, a pioneer in qualitative system dynamics, presented his 
terror network, called ‘terror prevention,’ some months after 9/11 and was able to visualize 
the impact of the countermeasures taken by the US government. In his preliminary 
conclusions – based on the network’s cybernetics – he emphasized that the pursuit of the head 
of the terror network has only a very small impact on the network and does not destabilize it.  
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Figure 2. The terror network 
 
Starting with Vester’s network we shifted the focus from a US-based network to a more 
international one because, since 9/11, there have been terrorist attacks in other countries such 
as 2002 in Bali
26
 and 2005 in London.
27
 The attacks in Bali and London claimed smaller 
numbers of victims than the 9/11 attacks but had disastrous consequences nonetheless. Al-
Quaida played an important role in both attacks. The London attack was carried out by a 
group with the same ideology as Al-Quaida,
28
 and the Indonesian terror branch ‘Jeemah 
Islamiah’ was responsible for the Bali attack.29 The network in Figure 2 presents the activities 
of a large, internationally active terrorist organization such as Al-Quaida for example. 
According to Andreas Wenger, professor of International Security Policy at ETH Zurich, this 
kind of organization has to be fought in the near future.
 
Al-Quaida carried out attacks in 
Western (and, increasingly, Asian) countries not only to weaken these countries’ economies 
and governments but also to provoke military overreactions. These overreactions are likely to 
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strengthen the conservative and anti-Western forces in the Al-Quaida’s home countries and 
weaken liberal forces more receptive to Western values.
30
  
The revised terror network is composed of 16 influencing variables. The interconnections 
between the variables can be either positive (solid lines) or negative (dotted lines). The 
network shows the impacts of attacks as well as the impacts of countermeasures taken by 
governments. The network contains all stakeholders involved in terror activities, which are 
identified as aggressors, victims or governments. 
THE VARIABLES IN THE TERROR NETWORK 
(1) Influence of the organization, inclusive of its leadership: This variable involves the 
management and leadership of a terror organization. Terror organizations are often managed 
in a very strict hierarchy, and power is not concentrated in one person but in several people. 
This prevents the destruction of entire organization if the leader is killed or captured. 
However, the charisma of a leader is not to be underestimated. The leader often serves as a 
figurehead and represents the values and culture of the terrorist network.
31
 
(2) Recruitment of potential manpower: This element involves people’s willingness to 
sacrifice their lives for a certain ideology. Their hatred and conviction have reached such an 
extent that they are ready to sacrifice themselves for this cause. The motivation to engage in 
terrorist actions can originate from multiple sources. A strong wish for a change with respect 
to politics or religion is generally the initial driver. A blind religious zeal aiming at destroying 
existing structures can lead to terror attacks, but a wish to gain public attention for certain 
objectives or the spread of symbolic messages can also be reasons to carry out terrorist 
attacks. 
(3) Density of the terrorist organization: This parameter can be understood as the number of 
terrorists per area (region/country). A high density indicates a high number of terrorists 
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collaborating in a specific region and thus implies the possibility of substantial knowledge 
transfer. In such an environment, a terrorist organization is capable of planning and executing 
sophisticated attacks. However, the risk of being caught increases dramatically. Since 9/11, 
terror networks have changed their structure and have become more decentralized. Today, 
they have few central leaders but have increased the number of autonomous militant terror 
cells.
32
 Under this organizational form, less information can be exchanged, but the danger of 
being discovered is considerably lower.   
(4) Negative perception of industrial countries: This variable involves denial and bitterness 
with respect to Western standards and ideologies and can be attributed to different causes. 
One of these causes may be globalization and the opinion that only Western countries have 
benefited from it. Another cause could be Western values and culture, which do not fit with 
their traditional values.
33
 Often Western countries are regarded as arrogant and as not 
respecting other cultures and traditions. If the influence of negative perceptions increases, 
then the power of the terrorist organization will increase, and it will be easier to recruit new 
terrorists for attacks.  
(5) Quality of life in emerging or developing countries: This element addresses the quality of 
life in non-industrial countries. Normally, the standard of living is higher in industrial 
countries because citizens have political rights and can intervene in political or social 
problems. In contrast, in emerging or developing countries people have almost no rights and 
thus feel helpless and exposed to the power of the regime. Depending on the government, 
religious tolerance can also vary considerably, which may lead to the persecution of religious 
minorities.  
(6) Security measures: The protection of the civil population is a prominent goal of every 
government. However, complete protection is not possible, as the control mechanisms 
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required to accomplish this would ruin a democracy and undermine its population’s civil 
liberties. 
(7) Control of overreaction: Overreaction after a terrorist attack must be avoided. There is 
some danger that, immediately after an attack, highly emotional decisions are made, and 
rational thinking is undermined. Resulting countermeasures that punish not only the terrorists 
but entire populations are counterproductive and tend to generate more support for the 
terrorists. The danger of overreaction increases not only following an attack but also in 
advance of a potential attack. National security advisers and intelligence services often 
receive warnings about terrorist activities. Their overreaction could lead to permanent 
mobilization on the part of the terrorists.
34
 
(8) Media reports: Reports in the press are very important because attacks without any echo 
in the media are regarded as a failure. Media reports are essential for the terrorist organization 
to spread their ideologies, objectives and political ambitions. 
(9) Intragroup communication and coordination: This variable is related to the density of the 
terrorist organization. Increased collaboration and exchange of knowledge among terrorists 
before an attack has a greater effect. Communication and coordination are essential 
ingredients for a successful operation.  
(10) Support by sympathizers: Sympathizers or followers are important for the purchasing of 
resources (material, infrastructure, people and money). Sympathizers can involve regimes that 
share the same cultural background or the same values as the terrorists or can involve single 
persons or foundations giving money to terrorists.
35
 
(11) Impact of attacks: This element incorporates several aspects: the symbolism of an attack, 
the number of people injured or killed and economic damages. An attack with greater 
symbolic value is more beneficial for a terrorist organization. For example, 9/11 was very 
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successful as a symbolic event. Within a few hours, Al-Quaida was known worldwide for 
having successfully attacked the powerful US and, with it, Western civilization as a whole. 
Whereas the number of injured or dead people can be estimated, the amount psychological 
damage, such as trauma or depression, is difficult to measure. Further damages, such as water 
and environmental pollution, as well as the inhalation or consumption of resultant toxic 
substances intoxication, can form part of this variable. 
The terrorist organization wants to weaken the economy of its enemies. An attack that inflicts 
more damage is more successful. Economic damage includes the destruction of houses and 
other infrastructure as well as decreasing stock prices and trading volumes in international 
capital markets.
36,37
  
The economic effect of 9/11 was estimated by the OECD to be 27 billion dollars.
38
 
(12) Return to normal life: A return to normal daily life should be the central objective of all 
anti-terror measures. Although a life with no terrorism may be a utopian ideal, the goal of 
anti-terror policy ought to be to enable the population to live as normally as possible and to 
employ minimal security restrictions. This entails a friendly coexistence of all different states 
and an appreciation of different cultural values.
39
 
(13) Financial and material resources: Continuous financial inflows are of prime importance 
to terrorist organizations. Their financial resources include all the money coming from 
different activities of the sympathizers, such as kidnapping, arms and drug trade or the abuse 
of donations or Hawala transfers.
40
 Material resources include passports, arms, 
communication facilities, transportation options and rented housing, which serves as shelters 
or local headquarters for the terrorists. Due to the lack of concrete data, there exist only 
estimates of these resources.
41
 Experts have estimated Al-Quaida’s budget for the period 
2001-2004 to have been 20-50 million dollars.
42
 The budget for all Arabic/extremist terror 
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organizations in 2001-2004 is estimated to have been 300 million dollars. If it is true that the 
direct costs for 9/11 were approximately 200,000 dollars,
43
 the terrorist organizations have 
enough money to plan and execute other activities.  
(14) Right target of anti-terror measures: Choosing the right target of anti-terror measures 
and avoiding overreaction are very important. History has shown that blind countermeasures 
can have negative effects. The destruction of civil infrastructure, such as homes, hospitals or 
schools, can be very counterproductive and increase a local population’s support of a terrorist 
organization. Terrorists must be identified and specifically persecuted. 
(15) Anti-terror support by moderate forces: Moderate forces are population groups in a 
hostile country, area or organization that are against terrorism. They can be composed of 
politicians who would like to introduce democratic reforms into politics or military forces that 
actively combat terrorism.
44
 In general, moderate forces are all parts of the population that 
address social and political grievances with peaceful approaches, such as demonstrations. 
These moderate population groups are important allies in countries fostering terrorism. 
Therefore, communication and dialogue with these forces must be pursued and facilitated. 
(16) International anti-terror support and coordination: This variable involves international 
anti-terror support and all anti-terror countermeasures taken by allied governments, 
institutions and organizations. Coordination and the common planning of activities are 
important in this regard. This includes military support as well as data and information 
exchange, embargos and economic sanctions. The success of these actions depends on how 
well the different actors are collaborating and following a common project or program. 
Because national states have different objectives, it is not always easy to define a common 
project or program. Collaboration can be very complicated if new, non-traditional alliances 
must be established and states sharing a cultural background with the terrorists have to be 
involved. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE NETWORK 
In a first step we built a network to illustrate how the different variables are linked together. 
Now we are interested to know in which direction one variable influences another and if this 
happens immediately or with delay. In order to quantify impact and time delay we use two 
matrices: Cross-Impact Matrix (CIM) and Cross-Time Matrix (CTM). It is very important to 
notice that the data filled in the matrices are solely for didactic purposes and are not validated 
by experts. The goal of this section is to present a new method how security experts could 
approach terrorism.  
Impact of the different Variables 
To describe the influence of each variable, we use a Cross-Impact Matrix (CIM). In contrast 
to other authors as Gomez and Probst or Vester, we value only direct relationships and ask 
decision makers to complete the CIM accordingly.
45
 To indicate the strength of the variables’ 
relationships in the terror network, the following code is used:  
Table 1. Codes used to describe the impact 
-1    inversely proportional 
Variable B reacts inversely proportional in reference to a shift in variable A 
0 (empty)   no influence  
There is no direct link between variables A and B 
+1    proportional  
Variable B reacts proportionally with regard to a shift in variable A 
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Consequently, we evaluate each link between two variables as either +1 or -1. We could also 
expand the range of code with disproportionately low (2/3) and high (3/2) impact values but 
for didactic reasons we preferred to work in this paper with proportional and inversely 
proportional effects.     
Table 2. Cross-Impact Matrix 
 
Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 AS 
 
  
                 1 Influence of the terrorist organization (incl. head)   1   1       1   1     1       5 
2 Recruitment of potential manpower 1   1               1           3 
3 Density of the terrorist organization 1               1         1     3 
4 Negative perception of industrial countries   1                         -1   2 
5 Quality of life in other cultures   -1   -1                         2 
6 Security measures     -1               -1 -1         3 
7 Control of overreaction       -1 1                 1 1   4 
8 Media reports 1           -1                   2 
9 Intragroup communication & coordination 1 1                 1           3 
10 Support by sympathizers   1                     1       2 
11 Impact of attacks 1         1 -1 1       -1   -1   1 7 
12 Return to normal life             1                   1 
13 Financial and material resources 1 1                 1           3 
14 Right target of anti-terror measures -1 -1 -1 -1                     1   5 
15 Anti-terror support by moderate forces -1 -1               -1     -1       4 
16 International anti-terror coordination             1                   1 
  PS 8 8 3 4 1 1 4 2 1 2 4 2 3 3 3 1   
  Degree of cross-linking (AS + PS) 13 11 6 6 3 4 8 4 4 4 11 3 6 8 7 2   
 
The active sum (AS) is the sum of all of the direct influences (outgoing flows) that can be 
attributed to a certain variable. It is the sum of the values in the row of a single variable and 
indicates how strongly this variable affects or dominates the system. A high active sum (AS) 
indicates great influence in the system. The passive sum (PS) is the sum of all of the incoming 
flows and indicates how strongly a variable is affected or dominated by the system. To 
calculate the incoming and outgoing flows, only the absolute values can be taken into account.  
The degree of cross-linking depicts how strongly the different influencing factors are 
interconnected. A higher number indicates that a variable is more essential for the survival of 
the system. Hence, the removal of a highly interlinked element from the system may lead to a 
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partial or complete collapse of the system.  
Table 2 presents the results of the Cross-Impact Analysis. In our terror network, we are 
mostly interested in the dynamic evolution of the influence of the terrorist organization. This 
element is of crucial importance for the entire terror system, as is reflected in its having the 
highest degree of cross-linking of all variables. In addition, this variable has more ingoing 
than outgoing links, meaning that this influencing factor is very sensitive to changes in the 
terror network. The variables recruitment of potential manpower and impact of attacks are 
also of particular significance. Both have a high degree of cross-linking but differ in the ratio 
of the active sum to the passive sum. The element impact of attacks has the highest active sum 
in the entire network. Therefore, the entire system is sensitive to change in this specific 
element. This finding of the Cross-Impact Matrix is not surprising. To maintain a certain level 
of influence, the terrorist organization must rely on the continuous hiring of new manpower 
and must execute terror attacks that feature high symbolic value. Therefore, it is logical that 
these variables occupy a central position in the network.  
Time Delay 
In qualitative system dynamics, time plays a major role. We are interested to know how a 
system or network develops over time. If we adjust one variable, the effect will not spread 
immediately through the system. Therefore, there are delays that we must include in our 
model. To accommodate time in this setup, a Cross-Time Matrix is constructed. The 
procedure is analogous to the construction of the Cross-Impact Matrix. Again, for the sake of 
complexity and clarity, only direct links are taken into account.  
The matrix is compiled with the following data (see Table 3): 
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Table 3. Codes used to indicate time delay 
0 (empty)   no influence 
There is no direct link between variable A and B; consequently, no delays can occur 
1    short-term (< 1 year) 
If variable B reacts with a short time delay to a change in variable A 
2    middle-term (1-3 years) 
If variable B reacts with a moderate time delay to a change in variable A  
4    long-term (> 3 years) 
If variable B reacts with a long time delay to a change in variable A 
 
To avoid bias, the time categories must be associated with real numbers and coded 
proportionally. It should be noted that, depending on the system, the time categories can refer 
to different time frames. 
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Table 4. Cross-Time Matrix 
 
Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 PD 
 
  
                 1 Influence of the terrorist organization   2  4    1  1   2    2.0 
2 Recruitment of potential manpower 2   1               2           1.7 
3 Density of the terrorist organization 2               1         2     1.7 
4 Negative perception of industrial countries   4                         1   2.5 
5 Quality of life in other cultures   4   4                         4.0 
6 Security measures     1               1 1         1.0 
7 Control of overreaction       1 1                 1 2   1.3 
8 Media reports 1           1                   1.0 
9 Intragroup communication & coordination 2 2                 2           2.0 
10 Support by sympathizers   1                     2       1.5 
11 Impact of attacks 1         1 1 1       1   1   1 1.0 
12 Return to normal life             1                   1.0 
13 Financial and material resources 2 2                 2           2.0 
14 Right target of anti-terror measures 1 1 1 1                     1   1.0 
15 Anti-terror support by moderate forces 4 2               4     4       3.5 
16 International anti-terror coordination             2                   2.0 
  RD 1.9 2.3 1.0 2.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.8 1.0 2.7 1.3 1.3 1.0   
 
Produced delay (PD) and received delay (RD) are mean values of every row (PD) and column 
(RD).  
Figure 3. Produced and received delay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 is a schematic representation of produced and received delay with respect to a 
variable A. Produced delay is the average time an impulse needs to reach a subsequent node 
from variable A. This is a measure of how much delay a variable causes in the entire system.  
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On the contrary, received delay indicates the average time required for an impulse to arrive at 
variable A from a preceding node. Therefore, received delay is a measure of the time required 
for variable A to react to changes in the system. 
Intervention Variables 
From a system dynamics perspective, it is of special interest which variables are suited for 
intervention. These elements must have a great impact on the entire system and act with no or 
little time delay. To identify such influencing factors, it is necessary to combine the Cross-
Impact and Cross-Time Matrix. More precisely, a coordinate plane is created with the 
produced delay on the abscissa and the active sum on the ordinate. 
Figure 4. Best intervention variables 
 
Figure 4 shows a portfolio in which impact and time are reflected. The coordinate plane can 
be divided into four quadrants each representing a specific cluster of variables with respect to 
impact and delay. The terms braking and lively refer to the time dimension, and active and 
buffering refer to the impact dimension.  
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An ideal intervention variable ought to have a dominant position in the network and thus a 
high number of outgoing links (high active sum). In addition, an appropriate element for 
intervention ought to quickly spread stimuli throughout the network (low produced delay). 
Therefore, the best intervention variables are found in the upper-right quadrant, which is 
labeled lively active. 
However, an intervention variable must be controllable by policy makers. Consequently, this 
excludes variables 1 (influence of the terrorist organization) and 11 (impact of attacks) from 
being an ideal intervention element because individuals outside the terror network simply 
cannot influence these parameters. Variable 14 (right target of anti-terror measures) satisfies 
the criteria of a perfect steering element and is controllable. This means for a government that 
actively fights terrorism, choosing the right target to weaken the terrorist organization is of 
crucial importance. This is a reasonable and clearly anticipated result. Other variables suited 
for intervention are more difficult to determine from Figure 4. If we place greater weight on 
the active sum than on produced delay, two additional variables will come into consideration: 
variables 7 (control of overreaction) and 15 (anti-terror support by moderate forces). The 
control of overreaction is an essential element in the terror network. Terrorists aim to provoke 
disproportionate and rash retaliations following an assault. This significantly facilitates the 
recruitment of new terrorists and irreversibly deteriorates the reputation of the retaliating 
country. Therefore, the use of a control mechanism with respect to premature and blind 
retaliation is very important for addressing terrorism. Variable 15 (anti-terror support by 
moderate forces) is another plausible intervention option for decision makers. This element 
has considerable impact on the entire system but acts slowly.  
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Path Analysis 
In the next step, we analyze the consequences of intensifying (positively stimulating) our 
detected intervention variables. We are interested in measuring their effects on the most 
important variable: the influence of the terrorist organization (variable 1). To do so, various 
path analyses are executed. A path is a sequence of links connecting a starting variable to a 
target variable. In complex networks such as our terror network there are potentially hundreds 
of paths between two nodes. The following questions are of particular interest in this context: 
- How many different paths in the terror network exist from the intervention variable to 
the target variable (influence of the terrorist organization)? 
- When do these paths arrive at the target variable (time delay)? 
- What is the effect of these paths? 
To calculate the different paths and their corresponding effect and delay, we applied a 
pathfinder algorithm. The algorithm takes the initial variable and searches for all possible 
paths toward a target node.
46
 It is important to notice that each path is unique and that a vertex 
can be crossed only once per path.  
Figure 5 displays the results of the first path analysis between the intervention variables right 
target of anti-terror measures (variable 14) and influence of the terrorist organization 
(variable 1). 
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Figure 5. Frequency distributions of all paths between variables 14 and 1 
 
 
In total there are 529 possible paths that conjoin these two variables. The vast majority (416) 
have a negative impact on the influence of a terrorist organization. In Figure 5, these paths are 
represented by dark, framed bars. However, there are 113 paths that boost the influence of a 
terror network (bright bars). First, the results confirm the obvious: the careful choice of target 
by a retaliating country has a significant negative impact on the influence of a terrorist 
structure.  
As a measure of effectiveness, we propose to examine primarily the ratio between the total 
number of negative and positive paths: 
Total number of negative paths / total number of positive paths = 416 / 113 = 3.68 
This parameter becomes important if different intervention variables are compared with 
respect to the influence of the terrorist organization.  
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Now, we more closely examine the two distributions (dark and bright distributions) depicted 
in Figure 5. It is important to note that the values on the abscissa have per se no explanatory 
power but that in relation to other distributions we can make a statement using these values. 
The frequency distribution resulting from the negative paths is negatively skewed. In 
comparison with a Gaussian distribution, the left tail is longer, and the mass center is located 
on the right side. The extended left tail implies that choosing the right target of anti-terror 
measures will have a substantial and immediate negative effect on the influence of the 
terrorist organization. However, due to the asymmetry of this distribution, the median lies 
slightly to the right. Consequently, it takes a long time for the full effect to be measurable in 
the target variable. The frequency distribution resulting from the positive paths will never be 
detectable and is completely overlapped by the other distribution.  
To offer a possibility of comparison, we show also the results of a second path analysis 
between the intervention variable, anti-terror support by moderate forces (variable 15), and 
influence of the terrorist organization (variable 1).     
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Figure 6. Frequency distributions of all paths between variables 15 and 1 
 
 
Between these two variables, we have 399 paths in total. The effectiveness ratio in this case is 
3.16. Therefore, anti-terror support by moderate forces continues to have a considerable 
negative impact on the influence of the terror network but is certainly less striking than the 
right target selection.  
The dark frequency distribution is approximately bell-shaped, meaning that the tail regions 
are thin and that the mass is concentrated around the mean. Therefore, no or little negative 
effect is detectable within a short period of time. In contrast to right target choice (variable 
14), it takes less time for anti-terror support by moderate forces to have its full effect on the 
target variable. What is remarkable is that the medians of the two distributions differ 
significantly. In Figure 6, we see that when the dark distribution is peaking, the other is still 
rising. Consequently, we measure only little or no negative impact on the influence of the 
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A B
C D
 
 
 
 
A B
C D
 
 
 
 
terrorist organization in the long run because there are an increasing number of paths aiding 
the terrorist structure.   
Network stability 
In the last part of the network analysis section, network robustness is the central issue. In this 
context, feedback cycles play a crucial role. Feedback loops are structural elements of 
networks that mostly determine these networks’ stability. Feedback cycles are closed loops 
starting and ending at the same node. This structure implies that a change in an involved 
variable affects not only subsequent elements but also the changing variable itself.  
Feedback loops are generally classified into two categories: reinforcing or positive feedback 
cycles and balancing or negative feedback cycles. Figure 7 illustrates the difference between 
these two different feedback systems. 
Figure 7. Reinforcing and balancing feedback loops 
 
 
 
Reinforcing feedback cycles are destabilizing factors in a system. Each variable involved is 
either growing (motor) or declining over time. In short, positive feedback loops boost or 
amplify whatever is occurring in the system. In contrast to reinforcing cycles, balancing 
feedback loops equilibrate the system. If variable A is stimulated positively, the impulse will 
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change polarity during the loop and have a negative impact on variable A. Therefore, negative 
feedback cycles are self-correcting and aid stability.
47
  
Figure 8. Central reinforcing feedback loops 
 
 
Figure 8 depicts the four primary positive feedback cycles that increase the influence of the 
terrorist organization. For better visualization, we added two redundant links between the 
variable pairs 1/10 and 1/11. There is one small cycle including media reports in addition to 
influence of the terrorist organization. Additionally there are three larger feedback loops, 
each containing four variables. It is important to note that three influencing factors 
(recruitment of potential manpower, support by sympathizers and impact of attacks) 
participate in two feedback cycles.    
To better understand the structure of the terror network, we applied a search algorithm on 
feedback cycles.
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 The following issues are important in this context: 
- How many different feedback loops appear in our terror model? 
- What are the shares of reinforcing and balancing feedback loops? 
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- What are the consequences for network stability if single or multiple variables are 
removed? 
The third point is of special interest for policy makers. It is critically important to know which 
variables or combination of variables must be addressed to break down terror networks. Table 
5 summarizes the results of particular analysis.  
Table 5: Policy on/off analysis 
removed 
variable(s) 
# feedbacks # reinforcing 
(+) 
# balancing 
(-) 
min. path max. path # remaining feedbacks 
(in %) 
ratio ingoing paths 
on 1 
Intact network 2450 1824 626 2 13 100.00% 0.81 
1 405 297 108 2 12 16.53% -  
2 296 232 64 2 12 12.08% 0.76 
3 859 730 129 2 11 35.06% 0.68 
4 937 707 230 2 12 38.24% 0.79 
5 1911 1465 446 2 13 78.00% 0.69 
6 1910 1430 480 2 13 77.96% 0.87 
7 376 290 86 2 10 15.35% 0.73 
8 1649 1179 470 2 13 67.31% 0.88 
9 1560 1121 439 2 13 63.67% 0.85 
10 1253 938 315 2 12 51.14% 0.85 
11 192 128 64 2 11 7.84% 1.1 
12 1798 1238 560 2 13 73.39% 0.9 
13 694 545 149 2 12 28.33% 0.87 
14 954 732 222 2 13 38.94% 0.64 
15 568 434 134 2 12 23.18% 0.61 
16 2124 1791 333 2 13 86.69% 0.68 
8;10;13 267 199 68 2 11 10.90% 1 
10;11;13 72 51 21 2 9 2.94% 1.08 
4;10;11 49 35 14 2 9 2.00% 1.12 
2;11;3 22 22 0 2 8 0.90% 1 
2;10;11 18 17 1 2 7 0.73% 1.04 
2;4;11 13 12 1 2 7 0.53% 1.05 
2;11;13 11 10 1 2 6 0.45% 1.06 
2;11;8 6 5 1 2 5 0.24% 2.05 
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The upper part of Table 5 depicts the implications on the network if a single variable is 
deleted. The consequences for the network if several elements are removed can be observed 
in the lower part.  
Because the established terror network in Figure 2 is quite complex and the elements are 
highly interconnected, many feedback loops exist. In total, there are 2450 feedback cycles 
composed of roughly 75 % reinforcing feedback loops and 25 % balancing feedback loops. 
The length of cycles varies between 2 and 13 variables.  
To effectively combat our terror network, we must break the central reinforcing feedback 
loops displayed in Figure 8. Variable 11 (impact of attacks), which is part of two positive 
feedback cycles, has the greatest effect on network stability. If this element is removed from 
the system, the total number of feedback loops will decrease by approximately 92 %. This 
finding is not at all surprising because each terrorist organization plans and executes attacks to 
cause the most severe physical and psychological damage. Therefore, it is of great importance 
for every country threatened by terrorism to protect potential targets in the best possible way: 
by protecting particular buildings and places that have great historic value and those that 
attract many people. Another key variable is the recruitment of potential manpower. This is 
the fuel in the terror network. Stopping recruitment would cause the total number of feedback 
loops to drop by roughly 88 %. Stopping the inflow of new manpower in a terrorist 
organization is a complex task and requires a large amount of time and resources as well as a 
deep understanding of the underlying causes that lead young men to join a terror network. 
Often it is a lack of prospects in poor and underdeveloped countries that provides a 
foundation for terrorism. 
The best results can be achieved if variables 2, 11 and 8 (recruitment of potential manpower, 
impact of attacks and media reports) are switched off. Effectively targeting these variables 
completely crushes the network and leaves only six feedback loops remaining. Media reports 
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play a crucial role in the context of terrorism. Attacks that generate a large echo in the media 
help to strengthen the influence of the terrorist organization. Therefore, the press should strike 
the right balance between informing and over-informing about terror attacks. 
The last column of Table 5 shows the ratio between total number of negative and positive 
paths incoming on variable 1 (influence of the terrorist organization). As long as this value 
lies below 1 there is a net positive effect on the influence of the terrorist organization. If we 
just remove one variable the only possibility to lift this number above 1 is by switching off 
variable 11 (impact of attacks). Tackling multiple variables leads to very promising results 
especially the combination of variables 2, 11 and 8.  
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this paper is to approach the dangerous and widespread phenomenon called 
terrorism from a virtual novel perspective. Terrorism is a complex problem; therefore, simple 
solutions focusing on only one aspect are destined to fail. We must capture terrorism in its 
entirety, and qualitative system dynamics offers tools to support this end. The key to success 
is the modeling process. We must construct a model that reflects the most relevant influencing 
factors and their interdependencies accurately to produce reliable outcomes. 
Once a well-grounded model is available, different analyses from the field of system 
dynamics can be performed. First, it is important to characterize each relationship and answer 
the following questions: 
- How strongly does one variable influence another? 
- How long does it take for this effect to be measurable? 
A portfolio in which time and effect are mirrored enables the deduction of the best 
intervention variables in the system. By definition, a steering variable has a dominant position 
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in the network (high active sum) and quickly distributes stimuli throughout the network (low 
produced delay).  
In our model, we found three variables suitable for intervention: 
- Control of overreaction 
- Right target of anti-terror measures 
- Anti-terror support by moderate forces 
Next, we studied in detail the effects of two intervention variables on the influence of the 
terrorist organization. Because there is not only one connecting path between the intervention 
and the target variable, we applied a pathfinder algorithm to reveal all possible routes. One 
astonishing result is that both right target of anti-terror measures and anti-terror support by 
moderate forces show, in addition to a dominant negative effect, a small enhancing effect on 
the influence of the terrorist organization. 
Finally, we tested the robustness of the network by removing single and multiple variables. 
To completely break down our terror model, we must approach the problem in three different 
areas: 
- Recruitment of potential manpower 
- Impact of attacks 
- Media reports 
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